The Calcutta Review June 1953

Now the upholder of the hypothesis may think in a different line and hold that the perception of smoke will not be followed again by186 THE CALCUTTA REVIEW [JUNE the remembrance of inductive judgment and by the judgment involing the applieid induction but the previous judgment referring to the applied induction will be revived in one's memory just after the remembrance' of the judgment that f [...] The objection that if the hypothesis of the penultimate premiss of the Nyaya syllogisul (i.e. the judgment involving the application of induction to a particular case) is not assumed then the terin upanaya ' becomes meaningless will be discussed in the proper context. [...] We think that there is no further necessity of pushing the matter to a greater length Thus the commentator of the NyTtya-sutra has thought only of the immediate judgment that wood-apple is conducive to pleasure as the result of the visual perception of a wood-apple since he remembers the possibility of such immediate judgment at the time of discovery of invariable concomitance. [...] On the other hand in the same case two pieces of knowledge which are causally connected exist on the same locus like the know ledge of an invariable mark and that of the object marked and like the awareness of a predicate and the relational knowledge i.e. [...] The sutra on perception does not include the contact of the soul with the internal organ in the list of the causal factors of perception though it is one of its conditions because the above contact is the common factor of all forms of consciousness but not a special condition of perception.